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CASE COMMENTS
state or a municipality which "substantially interferes" with the
owner's use and ownership of his property is a taking of such pro-
perty without compensation and is prohibited by the West Virginia
constitution.
The New York court in Clement noted that, in general courts
have been reluctant to find a problem of a de facto taking. The
court reasoned that this is probably because the problem has not
often arisen. Today's widespread urban renewal projects and
modern highway construction promise more and more de facto
taking cases. At present the problem is not of great magnitude in
West Virginia, though it may increase in the future. The West
Virginia court might well look to Clement in fashioning a modem
rule to provide appropriate relief to prevent serious injustice in
situations involving the wholesale appropriation of property by
eminent domain.
James M. Henderson, 11
Income Tax-Stock Redemption:
"Essentially Equivalent To A Dividend"
In 1945 taxpayer and E. B. Bradley organized a corporation.
In exchange for property contributions, Bradley received five hun-
dred shares of common stock and taxpayer and his wife each receiv-
ed two hundred fifty shares. Taxpayer later purchased an addi-
tional one thousand shares of preferred stock at a par value of
twenty-five dollars per share in order for the company to qualify
for a federal loan, the corporation agreeing to redeem the pre-
ferred stock when the loan had been repaid. Before the redemption,
taxpayer bought Bradley's five hundred shares and divided them
between his son and daughter. Then in 1963, when the corpora-
tion redeemed the preferred stock, taxpayer, in his personal income
tax return, did not report the twenty-five thousand dollars received
by him as income. "Rather, taxpayer considered the redemption
as a sale of his preferred stock to the company-a capital gain trans-
action under section 802 of the Internal Revenue Code resulting in
no tax since taxpayer's basis in the stock equaled the amount he
received for it."', The Commissioner disagreed with this and took
'United States v. Davis, 90 S. Ct. 1041, 1043 (1970). INT. Rrv. CODE OF
1954, § 302 provides that a redemption of stock by a corporation shall he treat-
ed as a distribution in part or full payment in exchange for the stock thus
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the position that the redemption, under sections 301,2 302,1 and
3164 of the code, was essentially equivalent to a dividend and there-
fore taxable as ordinary income. Consequently, taxpayer paid the
deficiency and brought suit for a refund. The District Court ruled
in taxpayer's favor 5 and the court of appeals affirmed, holding that
the redemption was "not essentially equivalent to a dividend" and
therefore qualified for capital gain treatment.( The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari.j Held; reversed. Through appli-
cation of the family attribution of ownership rules to the stock
redemption, the distribution by the corporation was essentially
equivalent to a dividend and taxable as such. Davis v. United
States, 90 S. Ct. 1041 (1970).
Sections 301 s and 3160 of the Internal Revenue Code provide
that a distribution by a corporation should be included in a tax-
payer's gross income as a dividend out of earnings and profits to
the extent such earnings and profits exist. However, certain excep-
tions to the application of this rule are found under section 302.10
qualifying for capital gains treatment if any of the following conditions are
met:
1) the redemption is not essentially equivalent to a dividend;
2) the distribution is substantially disproportionate with res-
pect to the shareholder;
8) the redemption is a complete redemption of all the stock
owned by the shareholder.
2 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 301 provides in part that a distribution of pro-
perty or money by a corporation to a shareholder with respect to its stock is
included in gross income to the extent the amount distributed is a dividend
under section 316.
3 See note 1, supra.
41NT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 816 provides that:
rT]he term "dividend" means any distribution of property made
by a corporation to its shareholders-
I) out of its earnings and profits accumulated after February 28,
1918, or
2) out of its earnings and profits of the taxable year . . . with-
out regard to the amount of the earnings and profits at the time the
distribution was made. Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle,
every distribution is made out of earnings and profits to the extent
thereof, and from the most recently accumulated earnings and profits.
To the extent that any distribution is, under any provision of this
subchapter, treated as a distribution of property to which Section 301
applies, such distribution shall be treated as a distribution of property
for the purposes of this subsection.
5 Davis v. United States, 274 F. Supp. 466 (M.D. Tenn. 1967).
6 Davis v. United States, 408 F.2d 1189 (6th Cir. 1969).
7 United States v. Davis, 396 U.S. 815 (1969).
8 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 301 [hereinafter references to The Internal Rev-
enue Code will be by section number only].
0 § 316.
10 § 302, See note 1 for these exceptions.
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Section 30211 allows capital gain treatment for corporate dis-
tributions made in a stock redemption. Gain is recognized to the
extent that the distribution exceeds taxpayer's basis for his stock.
Redemption transactions are afforded two safe "harbors" from
dividend treatment: "The substantially disproportionate test of
subsection (b) (2) which requires a specified decrease in the tax-
payer's percentage ownership of voting stock (and all common
stock as well, if non-voting common is present) ; and the complete
termination test of subsection (b) (3) which requires all of tax-
payer's stock to have been redeemed."'12
Taxpayer in this case admitted that these two exceptions did
not apply to his situation because section 302 (c) (1) 13 provides for
the application of the attribution of ownership rules of section 318
(a) to sections 802 (b) (2) and (b) (3). Therefore, taxpayer was
considered to own all the common stock owned by his wife and
children in addition to the stock held in his own name.' 4
Taxpayer argued that the attribution of ownership rules do
not apply to section 302 (b) (1), and that the distribution by the
corporation in redemption of his one thousand shares of preferred
stock was not essentially equivalent to a dividend. Therefore he
claimed that he qualified for capital gain treatment. The pre-
liminary question to be considered was the applicability of the
attribution of ownership rules of section 318 (a) to section 302
(b) (1).
The treasury regulations state that the determination of
whether or not a distribution is essentially equivalent to a dividend
depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case." Construc-
tive stock ownership is merely one of the factors to be considered
in making this determination. Furthermore, section 318 (a) speci-
fies that the attribution rules are to be applied only where expressly
make applicable. Since section 302 (c) (1) provides that the attri-
bution rules are to be applied in determining the "ownership of
stock",' 7 the argument has been made that the attribution rules
1 Id.
12 D. HEuwrrz, Business Planning 476 (1966).
13§ 802 (c) (1): [Sjection 818 (a) shall apply in determining the owner-
ship of stock for purposes of this section.
'4 United States v. Davis, 90 S. Ct. 1041 (1970).
is Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2 (1960).
laid.
'7 § 302. See also, Lewis v. Commissioner, 35 T. 0. 71 (1960), which held
that section 302 (c) made the constructive ownership rules of section 318 (a)
applicable (with certain exceptions to be discussed later) to redemption tests.
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are not applicable to section 302 (b) (1) because it does not ex-
pressly refer to the "ownership of stock." However, it is reasonable
to apply the attribution rules whenever the "ownership of stock"
is relevant, whether by statutory direction or by implication. s
The historical development of section 302 (b) (1) supports
the application of the attribution rules to it. Attribution rules were
a part of the 1954 Code as originally proposed, but there was not
a section comparable to 302 (b) (1). When that section was added
during the course of the legislative process, there was no evidence
that the applicability of the attribution rules was to be restricted;
rather, the attribution rules were apparently to be applied to the
entire section 302.19
Several court decisions have applied the constructive owner-
ship rules in accord with the Treasury's interpretation. In Levin v.
Commissioner,20 the taxpayer argued that the family attribution
rules should not be applied to section 302 (b) (1). The argument
was based principally upon three prior court decisions: Lewis v.
Commissioner,21 Ballenger v. United States,22 and Himmel v.
Commissioner.23
In Lewis the tax court ignored the stock attribution rules
in deciding the 302 (b) (1) issue. However, the concurring opinion
pointed out that the court treated Lewis as owning his son's shares,
thus producing the same results as if the attribution rules had been
expressly applied. In Ballenger the attribution rules were applied,
although dictum indicated that they should not be applied too
literally to section 302 (b) (1).
Levine's reliance on Himmel (in which the court applied the
attribution rules to determine that if a dividend had been paid on
the common stock rather than a redemption of the non-voting
cumulative preferred, taxpayer would have constructively received
less than he did as a result of the redemption) was simply mis-
placed. The Court in Levin applied the attribution rules to section
302 (b) (1), noting that there may be cases in which strict applica-
tion of the rules may be inappropriate, but Levin did not present
such a case.
is See Bittker, The Taxatino of Stock Redemptions and Partial Liquida-
tions, 44 CoR~au.LL L. Q. 299 (1959).
19 United States v. Davis, 90 S. Ct. 1041 (1970).
20 385 F.2d 521, 526 (2d Cir. 1967).
2247 T. C. 129 (1966).
2301 F.2d 192 (4th Cir. 1962).
23338 F.2d 815 (2nd Cir. 1964).
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Where disharmony in the family relationship exists, attribution
may be inappropriate. Thus the redemption of taxpayer's shares in
a family estrangement situation might qualify for capital gain
treatment under section 301 (b) (1) although the attribution rules
would prevent it from qualifying as a substantially disproportionate
redemption under section 302 (b) (2).21 In Davis, however, there
was no such family discord and the court was able to apply section
318 to section 302 (b) (1) without considering this factor. Tax-
payer was therefore deemed to be the owner of all the shares of
common stock held by his family.
After the attribution rules were applied in Davis, a remain-
ing question was whether a corporation's redemption of part of the
shares of a sole stockholder is "always 'essentially equivalent to a
dividend' within the meaning of that phrase in section 302 (b) (1)
... ."25 Generally, a distribution of property by a corporation to
the extent of its earnings and profits is treated as a dividend and
includible in the shareholder's gross income.26 Section 302 (b) (1)
is an exception to this general rule providing that a redemption is
not includible in gross income as a dividend if the redemption is
"not essentially equivalent to a dividend."27 The question in
Davis and similar cases is one of equivalency; if equivalency is pre-
sent, the distribution is taxable as a dividend.
28
Most courts in their determination of whether a redemption is
essentially equivalent to a dividend have considered the net effect
of the transaction to be the single most important consideration.
The net effect test has in practice been applied in two different
ways, termed strict or flexible, so that really there are two differ-
ent tests.
29
"Under the 'strict net effect' test, if the taxpayer ends up in
the same position after the distribution as he would have occupied
had a dividend been declared, the net effect of the transaction is
held to be the payment of a dividend."' ° Applying the strict net
effect test to Davis, taxpayer, because of the attribution rules,
would be considered to own all the common stock of the corpora-
tion, so the distribution to taxpayer in payment for his preferred
2J See Levin v. Commissioner, 385 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1967); Bradbury v.
Commissioner, 298 F.21 111 (lst Cir. 1962); Estate of Arthur H. Squier v.
Commissioner, 35 T. C. 950 (1961).2 5United States v. Davis, 90 U.S. 1041 (1970).
26§316 (a); §301 (a); §301(c).
27 § 302 (b) (1).
2
8KerT v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1964).
29See Kerr v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1964).
30 Davis v. United States, 408 F.2d 1139, 1142 (6th Cir. 1969).
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stock would be pro rata on his common stock. And pro rate distri-
butions of earnings and profits with no basic change in sharehold-
er relationships are the hallmark of a dividend.
3 '
In the past many courts, through application of the "flexible
net effect test," have allowed a business purpose for the redemp-
tion to moderate the decisiveness of a strict net effect result.32 How-
ever, Ballenger v. United States33 held that an acceptable business
purpose can never be the reduction of income taxes since the pur-
pose of the statute is to prevent distribution of the earnings of the
corporation to the shareholders at the lower capital gain rates; and,
an appearance of tax avoidance is present where a shareholder
receives money for a sale of stock rather than stock in exchange for
stock.3 Thus, a taxpayer who could have accomplished his business
purpose without obtaining a dividend should not be allowed to
avoid the statutory scheme. In Davis taxpayer could have achieved
the same objectives without at the same time effecting a distri-
bution of corporate earnings at capital gains rates by exchanging
his preferred stock for common stock. Since he chose to have the
corporation redeem his stock by a distribution of corporate earn-
ings, he had to bear the tax consequences of the transaction.
When a corporation pays a dividend, the effect is to transfer
property from the company to the shareholders without any change
in the relative status of the stockholders. Where the effect of a
redemption, as in the Davis case, is the same, the distribution must
be held "essentially equivalent to a dividend."3 5 A primary step in
making such a determination must be whether the redemption of
stock has caused a meaningful change in the position of the share-
holders. In other words, the pro rata distribution of earnings and
profits is the earmark of a dividend, "and must be regarded as the
basic criterion of whether a particular distribution more closely
equates a sale or a dividend."' 8
83 See, e.g., Hasbrook v. United States, 343 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1965). In
Bradbury v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 111, 115-16 (1st Cir. 1962), the court stated:
Dividends are distributions of earnings and profits to the stock-
holders which do not change their proportionate interests in the cor.
poration. Consequently, as we have stated: "Logically, a redemption
of its stock by a corporation is 'essentially equivalent to the distri-
bution of a taxable dividend; . . . whenever the practical result of
the transaction is to distribute accumulated earnings essentially pro
rata among the shareholders while leaving the ownership of the cor-
poration basically the same." [citations and footnotes omitted].
82 Keefe v. Cote, 213 F.2d 651 (1954) (1st Cir. 1954).
88 301 F.2d 192 (4th Cir. 1962).
3' See Kerr v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1964).
85 United States v. Davis, 90 S. Ct. 1041 (1970).
36Bradbury v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 111, 116 (1st Cir. 1962).
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As Justice Douglas emphasized in his dissent, the practical
effect of Davis may be cancel section 802 (b) (1) from the Code.
8 7
Nevertheless, the decision ends the confusion surrounding the
lower courts' application of the "flexible net effect" test under
which a legitimate business purpose might make a stock redemp-
tion not "essentially equivalent to a dividend." As the result of this
decision there are no doubts remaining as to the application of
section 318 to section 302 (b) (1). On the other hand, as previous-
ly mentioned, the decision does not deal with the possibility of
exceptions to section 318, such as family hostility.38
Robert R. Fredeking II





As a result of a collision between an automobile, not covered
by an uninsured motorist provision, and an uninsured vehicle,
Mark Arminski, young suffered injuries in excess of $20,000. An
action for bodily injuries was instituted in Mark's behalf by his
father, Dr. Thomas Arminski, to whom the defendant insurance
company had issued a policy covering two cars and providing for
family protection and uninsured motorist coverage. Dr. Arminski
had paid two separate premiums for the uninsured motorist cover-
age. The defendant's liability for bodily injuries under the fam-
ily protection clause was limited to $10,000 for each person and
$20,000 for each accident.
The trial court found that defendant insurer, because it
charged two separate premiums for its coverage, was liable for
$20,000 notwithstanding the limitation of the family protection
clause. On appeal the Michigan Court of Appeals, adopting a
literal reading of the policy, held: reversed and remanded for
judgment to be entered in favor of defendant. Arminski v. United
States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 178 N.W.2d 497 (Mich. Ct. App.
1970).
The trial court distinguished the present case from the only
Michigan decision on point, Horr v. Detroit Automobile Inter.
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